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1. Introduction
In this paper I explore the determination of residential and job location and the pattern
of commuting behavior in an urban model with decentralized employment. Various authors
have explored models of cities with decentralized employment, but they have tended to
make very specialized assumptions concerning either the pattern of firm location or the
nature of household behavior and have often been forced to use numerical simulation
techniques to get results. In this paper I try to make very general assumptions concerning
firm and household behavior. This approach yields fewer definite answers, but it enables
me to consider some new questions.1
The most interesting result of the model is that under some circumstances, households
having identical tastes, income and number of workers will occupy different rings around
the city center depending on their job locations. This means that cities with decentralized
employment may not have the usual residential location pattern in which successively more
distant rings around the center are occupied by higher income households. Instead, in this
model, households' residential location choice depends on both their workers' job locations
and on their income levels. Thus a ring pattern is likely to emerge in which households
whose income levels are high but whose job locations are near the center will occupy
residential rings that are close to the center. They may be surrounded by rings occupied
by lower income households whose jobs are further out. Thus the non-monocentric city has
a non-monotonic pattern of income level changes with greater distance from the center.
This richer location pattern is more realistic than the simpler results of the traditional
urban model. It provides, for example, a formal model of the "gentrified" location pattern
observed in various cities in which high income households locate both near the center and
in the far suburbs.
The model also implies that otherwise identical workers will have different job locations
depending on their residential locations. In particular workers whose households have
closer-in residential locations demand a smaller wage premium for extra commuting than
do otherwise identical workers whose households live further out. The conditions under
which workers that live further from the center hold more suburbanized jobs are developed.
The model also yields interesting insights concerning how workers' wage offer curves for
jobs at particular locations differ according to their skill or income levels. It suggests that
the composition of a firm's workforce, i.e., its relative mix of high wage versus low wage
workers, is important in determining whether the firm will move out of CBD and, if so,
how far.
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Finally, the model moves toward a more general theory of commuting behavior which
synthesizes two previously conflicting views of commuting: that emerging from urban eco-
nomics, which argues that, longer commuting journeys are compensated by lower housing
prices, and that emerging from labor economics, which argues that longer commuting jour-
neys are compensated by higher wages.' The results suggest that both wages and housing
prices adjust to compensate for extra commuting in different circumstances, depending
on the direction in which the commuting journey is changed and whether the household
moves its job location or its housing location or both.
Section 2 of the paper briefly reviews the theory of a city with centralized employ-
ment. Section 3 discusses the incentives facing firms making location choices within a
metropolitan area and the commuting pattern that results for workers holding suburban
jobs. Section 4 introduces decentralized employment into the residential location choice
problem and explores its implications for the spatial variation of wages and land prices.
Section 5 explores the model's implications for commuting behavior and considers avenues
for further research.
2. Residential Location Choice in Cities with Centralized Employment
We start by briefly reviewing the theory of a circular city when all employment is at
the central business district (the CBD). Assume that the city is located on a flat featureless
plain and that the CBD is a point at its center. All households living in the city have one
worker. They have identical utility functions which depend on consumption of land for
housing, h, consumption of other goods, x, and leisure time of the worker, (.3 All of these
vary with residential distance from the center, denoted u. Thus the utility function is:
U = U(h(a),x(u),I(u)). (1)
Workers receive a fixed wage rate of w* per hour for working at the CBD at jobs
whose hours are assumed to be continuously variable. Monetary commuting cost is m
dollars per mile travelled in either direction and is constant at all locations. Commuting
speed is 1/s miles per hour and is also constant at all locations. Thus round trip monetary
commuting costs are 2mu and round trip commuting time is 2us. The rent per unit of
land for housing at distance u is p(ts). Households have a budget constraint and workers
are assurned to have a time constraint. Total time available, 24 hours per day, must be
split among leisure, work and commuting. Combining the household's time and money
constraints results in the "full income" constraint:
p(u)h(u) + x(u) +tu~L(u) = 24tc* -- 2(stu* + m)u, (2)
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where 24w* - 2(sw* + m)u is full income or the amount that workers could earn net of
time and money commuting expenses if they worked 24 hours a day.
Households maximize the utility function over their choice of h(u), x(u), . and 1(u),
subject to the full income constraint. The full income constraint must hold at all locations.
Therefore we can substitute eq. (2) into eq. (1) to get:
U[h(u), 24w* - 2(sw* + m)u - p(u)h(u) - w*(u),l(u)J.
Totally differentiating the utility function using the envelope theorem, we can derive the
condition on rent levels at different distances from the center such that a household achieves
equal utility at all residential locations. We get the following well-known condition which
is referred to as the household's rent offer curve for housing:
-2(sw* + m)
p.(u) =,(3) h(u)
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives.
Since work hours are flexible, the value of time at the margin must be w*. Thus the
numerator of (3) is the total cost of commuting an extra mile round trip, including the
monetary outlay and the value of time. Since the right hand side of (3) is negative, the
rent offer curve must always decline with distance from the city center.




The percent change in the rate of decrease of the rent offer curve must equal minus the
percent change in housing consumption with increased residential suburbanization. Since
consumption of land for housing rises in the suburbs where rents are lower, hu is positive.
The left hand side of (4) is therefore negative, so 8pu/8u must be positive. The slope of
the rent offer curve for housing thus gets flatter as u increases.
Equation (3) describes a necessary condition on the rent offer curve such that house-
holds having the utility function and full income constraint in eqs. (1) and (2) achieve
equal utility at all locations in a city having centralized employment. But if all households
in the city have identical tastes and incomes and if all have one worker whose job is at the
center, then the market equilibrium rent gradient must also satisfy eqs. (3) and (4). The
market equilibrium rent gradient is denoted p"m (u).
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Extending the model, suppose households still have identical tastes, but some workers
are skilled and some are unskilled. Skilled workers receive a wage rate of wb* per hour and
unskilled workers receive a lower wage rate of wd* per hour. In this case we can derive
separate conditions on the rent offer curves for each of the two groups. They are:
=-)2(swb*+ m)
PS /L(U) (5)
for unskilled workers and a similar condition (with superscripts d) for skilled workers.
Both skilled and unskilled workers' rent offer curves must decline at a decreasing rate
with distance. Skilled workers' households have higher demand for housing than unskilled
workers' households at any u, which tends to make their rent offer curves flatter. However
skilled workers' time is more valuable at the margin, which tends to make their rent offer
curve steeper. In general the first effect is usually assumed to be more important, making
the rent offer curve flatter for skilled than unskilled workers. Given this assumption, the
two rent offer curves are depicted in Figure 1. Skilled workers' households outbid unskilled
workers' households for land at suburban locations and unskilled workers' households out-
bid skilled workers' households at more central locations. Each group of households is now
indifferent to locating over a range of distances from the center, rather than everywhere
in the city. The market equilibrium rent gradient is the upper envelope of the two groups'
rent offer curves. It is shown as the dashed line in Figure 1.
With two income groups in the city, unskilled workers' households thus occupy a
region shaped like a thick ring around the CBD from distance u = 0 to u' in all directions
and skilled workers' households occupy a surrounding thick ring from distances u = u' to
the outer edge of the city, u*. The boundary between the ring occupied by unskilled and
skilled workers' households occurs at some location u'. However we have not given the
model enough structure to be able to determine the intercepts of the two functions or the
distance u' from the center at which they intersect.4
3. Firm Location Choice
In this section we briefly examine the problem of firm location choice and the char-
acteristics of labor markets in cities with decentralized employment. In particular we are
interested in establishing conditions under which at least some firms in the city have an
incentive to move out of the CBD. But we also wish to rule out conditions in which so
much firm suburbanization occurs that there is no commuting at all, because all workers
work at home at very srmall firms. We use v to denote workplace location, where v is






The city is assumed to be located on a flat featureless plain, where land is not spe-
cialized for use in housing versus in production. Also there is no zoning or other type of
land use regulation which might set particular regions of the city aside for particular land
uses. Firms are assumed to occupy some but not all of the land in all rings around the
CBD. Therefore the price that they pay for land in that ring is its value when used for
housing, or pm(u).& The assumption that some firms locate at all rings around the center
is made for convenience, since it allows workplace location, v, to be treated as a continuous
variable. But the general results of the model would not be changed if firms located in
some, but not all, suburban rings.
The wage which suburban firms must pay their workers depends on how much workers'
commuting journeys are shortened when the firm moves out of the CBD. Firms gain the
most from suburbanizing if after the move their workers live both further from the CBD
than the firm itself and in the same direction away from the CBD (i.e., along the same
ray from the CBD). We assume that all workers who take jobs at suburban firms satisfy
both of these conditions. This could be because workers already live in the relevant region
for their particular employer, or because they move there when the firm does or because
the firm hires new workers who already live in the relevant region after it moves. The
first of these two conditions eliminates the possibility of out-commuting by workers, i.e.,
it requires that workers live further from the CBD than their jobs. The second condition
eliminates circumferential commuting. These assumptions in fact are not as strong as
they might appear. For workers to be willing to commute outward or circumferentially
to suburban jobs, employers must pay them more than if they commuted in an inward
direction to the same jobs. Therefore it is in firms' interest to locate in such a way that
all their workers in-commute, i.e., so that all workers live further from the CBD than their
employers and along the same ray from the CBD.6
Assume that all workers have the same skill level and earn the same wage if they work
at jobs in the CBD. The CBD wage is again denoted w*. Since workers taking suburban
jobs have lower commuting costs than workers living at the same residential location who
work at CBD jobs, employers at any v > 0 are assumed to pay their workers a lower wage
than that prevailing at the center. The market wage gradient, denoted turn(v), therefore
must be negatively related to workplace location, v, or o9wm(v)/av < 0.
In moving to suburban locations, firms are assumed to spread out in all directions
around the CBD. This is because once some firms have located, say, exactly north of the
CBD, their presence discourages additional firms from also locating exactly north of the
5
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CBD, since all firms located along a single ray from the CBD must compete for workers
who live further out along the same ray. Other firms instead will prefer to locate the
same distance from the CBD, but one or more degrees away from north in either direction,
where the potential labor supply willing to work for the firm at the wage w m (v) is likely
to be larger. Thus there are agglomeration diseconomies as more firms locate along any
particular ray from the CBD, regardless of how far away from the CBD they locate. If
more jobs in total are offered by firms located along any particular ray than there are
workers living along the same ray, then firms will only be able to attract enough workers
if some workers out-commute or commute circumferentially. But this requires that firms
pay higher wages than would be necessary if they spread out in different directions, so that
all workers could in-commute. These assumptions imply that no suburban subcenters will
form which contain enough firms that they exhaust the labor supply composed of workers
who commute inward to the firms they work for.
It is interesting to note that firms which suburbanize drastically restrict the labor
market area from which they hire workers. While firms located at the CBD can hire
workers who live in any direction from the CBD; firms located, say, north of the CBD can
only hire workers who live both north of the CBD and further out than the firm. As a
result, moving out of the CBD will tend to be most attractive to firms that are relatively
small.
For our purposes, it is not necessary to present a formal model of firms' location de-
cision. Such a model would have firms gain from suburbanizing because they pay lower
land prices and lower wages in the suburbs, but their goods transport costs or their costs
of production could be higher. Firms would maximize profit over their choice of location,
where each location is a ring around the CBD. In such a model, it is reasonable to assume
that one suburban ring (or a few) would be the profit-maximizing location for any partic-
ular firm. This implies that identical firms would concentrate in one or a few suburban
rings, rather than distributing themselves over all suburban rings. However if there were
firms in many industries located in the city, then firms in each industry would locate in
the profit-maximizing ring for that industry, but nonetheless there would be firms of some
type located in many or all suburban rings. Note that agglomeration diseconomies also
result if many firms attempt to locate in the same ring. In this case firms would bid up the
price of land in that ring, giving themselves an incentive to choose locations in adjacent
rings which are slightly closer-in or further-out. These adjacent rings have lower demand
and therefore lower prices. If firms instead scatter over many rings, then they will pay for
land according to the market rent gradient established for land used for housing.7
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4. Residential and Job Location Choice in Cities with Decentralized Employrnent
We now generalize the model of household residential and job location choice to allow
for decentralized employment. This will enable us to investigate the characteristics of
equilibrium market rent and wage gradients in the decentralized city case.
Households again have a single worker and all workers are assumed to have the same
skill level. With decentralized employment, households' demand for goods and leisure
depends on both residential and job locations, u and v. Their utility function therefore
becomes U = U(h(u, v), z(u, v), l(u, v)).
In the decentralized employment case, there will be a market rent gradient, pm(u),
which depends only on residential distance from the center, u. In other words, the rent on
land at any u paid by households that live at that u will not depend on the job locations
of the households' workers. However we wish to consider the possibility that households
whose workers have different job locations may be willing to pay different amounts for land
at the same location. Therefore households' rent offer curves, denoted p(u, v), may depend
on both residential and workplace location. If households' rent offer curves do vary with
job location, then pm(u) will be the upper envelope of the set of rent offer curves of groups
of households having different job locations.
Similarly, there will be a market wage gradient, wm (v), which depends only on work-
place distance from the center. In other words, employers located v miles from the center
will pay the same wage to all workers regardless of their residential locations. However
we wish to consider the possibility that workers whose residential locations differ may be
willing to work at a particular job location for different wage levels. Thus workers' wage
offer curves, denoted w(u, v), may depend on both workplace and residential location. If
workers' wage offer curves do vary with residential location, then wm (v) will be the lower
envelope of the set of wage offer curves of groups of workers whose households have different
residential locations.
Households' full income constraint therefore becomes:
p(u, v)h(u, v) + z(u, v) + w(u, v)l(u, v) = 24w(u, v) - 2(snw(u, v) + m)(u - v), (6)
where p(u, v) and w(u, v) are now the rent offer and wage offer curves for the household
and its worker. Since all workers in-commute, one-way commuting distance is (u - v). Full
income, 24w(u, v) - 2(sw(u, v) + m)(u - v), is denoted F(u, ii).
Households maximize utility subject to the full income constraint over their choice
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of consumption levels of h(u, v), x(u, v), and l(u, v) and over their residential and job
locations, u and v. The full income constraint must be satisfied at all residential and
workplace locations. Substituting the full income equation into the utility function, we get
U[h, 24w(u, v) - 2(sw(u, v) + m)(u - v) - p(u, v)h - w(u, v)L, 1]. (7)
Households must achieve the same utility level at all workplace/residential location pairs
that they choose to occupy. Totally differentiating eq. (7) with respect to u and v and
using the envelope theorem, we get:
24w, -- 2swu(u -v) - 2(sw + m) - puh - wul = 0 (8)
and
24w,- 2sw.,(t&-v) + 2(sw + m) -- ph - wtl = 0. (9)
These equations, respectively, characterize households' rent and wage offer curves in the
decentralized city case.8
Focussing first on equation (8), we find that it contains terms in w,. However suppose
the household lives at an arbitrary residential location, u'. Also suppose that its worker
works at some job location v', where v' < u'. For the worker to work at v', it must be
the case that his/her wage offer at v' must be less than or equal to the wage offer at v'
of workers living either closer in or further out than u'. Therefore w (u', v') must equal
zero. (Alternatively, if all workers have the same wage offer curves regardless of residential
location, then w (u', v') also must equal zero.) Therefore solving for the household's rent
offer curve, we get:
-2(sw(v) + m)
p(u, v) = ((10)
h(u, v)
Turn now to eq. (9). It contains terms in p,,. But suppose a worker works at an
arbitrary job location v" and lives at an arbitrary residential location u", where u" > v".
For the worker's household to live at u", its rent offer at u" must be greater than or equal
to the rent offer at u" of households whose workers work either closer in or further out
than v". Therefore pp(u", v") must equal zero. Then solving for the worker's wage offer
curve, we get:
= -2(stu(v) + m)
2,4)-2st-)-( )(11)
In the next subsection we discuss rent offer curves and market rent gradients further.
The following subsection considers wage offer curves and market wage gradients. A third
subsection then reintroduces the possibility of workers having multiple skill levels.
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4.1 Rent Gradients in Decentralized Cities
How do the characteristics of households' rent offer curves compare in the centralized
versus the decentralized city cases? Examining eqs. (3) and (10), we find that rent
offer curves in the two cases have the same form, except that the wage rate varies with
job location in the latter. Rent offer curves therefore must always have negative slopes,
regardless of whether employment is centralized or decentralized.
But do rent offer curves also decline with distance at a decreasing rate in the de-
centralized employment case? To investigate this question, we differentiate eq. (10) with
respect to u, assuming an arbitrary fixed job location, v. (This procedure is followed since
the rent offer curve for a household gives its level of willingness-to-pay for land for housing
at different residential locations, given any fixed job location. Not all residential locations
will turn out to be feasible for a household having any particular job location, since it
may be outbid by other households for land at some locations, but its offer level can be
determined nonetheless.) The result is:
opu -puhu 12
Ou h
Examining (12), since hu(u, v) must be positive when v remains unchanged, 8pu/8u must
be positive. Therefore rent offer curves decline at a decreasing rate with distance from the
center of the city-the same result as in the centralized city case examined above.
We now turn to the question of whether, in a city with decentralized employment,
workers' job locations affect households' rent offer curves for land at particular residential
locations. In other words, we wish to establish whether or not otherwise identical house-
holds whose workers work at different job locations are willing to pay the same amount for
land at particular residential locations. If so, then households having different workplace
locations will mix together over at least some set of residential locations, as long as all
households live further out than their workers' jobs. If not, then households that differ
only by workplace location will segregate into different residential rings.
Examining eq. (10) above, we note that households' rent offer curves depend on
workplace location, v, as well as on residential location, u. To determine how a household's
rent offer curve depends on its worker's job location, we differentiate (10) with respect to
v, holding u constant. This allows us to determine how a household's willingness-to-pay
schedule for land for housing at all residential locations (including locations at which it
will be outbid) varies when its worker's job location changes. The result is:
8 pu 1 ~(3--- = -[-2swm, - a..(13
Boh
9
Eq. (13) is difficult to sign with confidence. The first term in square brackets is
clearly negative. The second term involves h,,, the variation in housing demand as the
household's workplace location becomes more suburbanized. If h, is positive or zero, then
the second term in (13) is also positive or zero and the sign of apu/ay will be positive. If
h,, is negative, then the sign of Opu/Ov can be positive, zero, or negative depending on the
size of ht. In fact, it seems most likely that the sign of h, is positive or zero, since h, is
the change in housing consumption when workplace location becomes more suburbanized
but residential location remains fixed. This means that workers' commuting journey is
reduced in both time and money cost and their wage rate is reduced, but not by enough
to make full income fall. In this case it seems unlikely that housing consumption would
fall and in general the effects on housing consumption of a change in v would seem likely
to be small. However, since we are unable to sign 8pu/8v with confidence, we consider all
three possibilities separately below.
Case 1. Assume that 8pu/Ov is positive. This means that households' rent offer
curves become flatter as workers' job locations become more suburbanized. This situation
is depicted in Figure 2 for a case in which residential locations vary continuously, but
there are assumed to be only two job locations: at the CBD, where v = 0, and at some
v = v' > 0. The steeper rent offer curve, labelled pi(u), is that of households whose workers
work at the CBD, while the flatter rent offer curve, labelled p2(u), is that of households'
whose workers work at V'. Note that only households whose workers work at the CBD bid
for land between u = 0 and u = V'.* Between u = v' and u', both groups of households
bid for land, but households whose workers work at the CBD outbid suburban workers'
households. Beyond u', both groups again bid for land, but households whose workers
work at the suburban job location, v', are willing to bid more. The residential boundary
between the two groups of households, u', must be at least as far out as the suburban
employment location, or u' ;> V'. Its precise location depends on the relative number of
workers employed at the CBD versus at the suburban employment ring. The market rent
gradient, pm(u), is the upper envelope of the two groups' rent offer curves. It is shown as
the dashed line in Figure 2.
This result is striking because it indicates that households may segregate into differ-
ent residential rings even when they have identical utility functions, the same number of
workers per household, and identical earning abilities. Previous urban models have only
resulted in residential segregation when either household tastes or household incomes, or
both, are assumed to differ. In this model, workers are indifferent over a range of residential
locations and commuting journey lengths, given their job locations. Workers who work at
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v' will be indifferent among among residential locations between u' and u*, the outer edge
of the city. They will therefore be indifferent among commuting journey lengths ranging
from a minimum of (u' - v') miles to a maximum of (u* - v') miles. Workers who work
at v = 0 will be indifferent among residential locations between u = 0 and u' and among
commuting journey lengths ranging from zero to u' miles. However all households in the
model achieve equal utility and are indifferent across all job location/residential location
pairs in the ranges just enumerated.
Case 2. Now suppose 8p,/8v = 0. In this case, households' rent offer curves for land
are unaffected by their workers' job locations, as long as only in-commuting occurs. Then
all households' rent offer curves are the same, regardless of their workers' job locations.
In the context of Figure 2, the two rent offer curves would be identical. This case leads
to the maximum amount of residential mixing possible in a model having decentralized
employment. Here, residential locations between the CBD and v' would still be occupied
exclusively by households having CBD workers, but residential locations between v' and
the outer edge of the city would be occupied by a mix of households whose workers work
at the CBD and at the suburban job location.
In this special case, the commuting pattern in the decentralized city has a simple
property: workers are indifferent over all commuting journey lengths as long as they in-
commute. Increases in the commuting journey length due to a household moving its
residential location further out are compensated by lower land prices (and vice versa);
while increases in the commuting journey length due to a worker moving his/her job
location further in are compensated by higher wages (and vice versa). As long as all
households have identical tastes and incomes, workers are indifferent over a wide range of
commuting journey lengths, from zero miles to u* miles. In this case, workers or households
would only have preferences for particular commuting journey lengths if they had tastes
or income levels which differed from the tastes or income levels of households generally,
such as having two workers when other households in the city have only one worker.10
Case S. Finally, suppose ap/av is negative. In this case, rent offer curves by house-
holds become steeper as their workers' job locations become more suburbanized. Suppose
again that there are only two job locations, at v = 0 and v'. Then the two groups' rent offer
curves are shown in Figure 3. Suburban workers' rent offer curve is now the steeper curve
labelled Pi (u), while CBD workers' rent offer curve is now the flatter curve labelled P2 (u).
Suburban workers' households outbid CBD workers' households for housing at the closer-in
region between u = 0 and u', while CBD workers' households outbid suburban workers'
11
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households for housing in the further-out region beyond t'. The market rent gradient is
again shown as a dashed line.
In this case suburban workers living between u = 0 and u = v' must out-commute to
their jobs. But if out-commuting occurs, then the situation depicted in Figure 3 cannot
be an equilibrium. To see this, compare the situations of two households whose workers
both work at v', but who live at u = v' + 1 and at u = v' - 1. Both workers earn the
same wage rate and both have the same length commuting journey. Households' indirect
utility function is V = V(p m (u), wm (v),24wm (v) - 2(sw"(v) + m)(u - v)). For the two
households, their wage rate and full income levels are the same, but their rent levels are
different Therefore their utility levels, V(pm (v' + 1), wm (v'), 24wm (v') - 2(swm (v')+ im))
for the household living at u = v'+1 and V(p m (v'-1), wm (v'),24wm (v')-2(swm (v')+m))
for the household living at t = '-1, cannot be the same. In order for the household living
at v' -1 to achieve the same utility level as the household living at v' + 1, the rent offer
curve p1(v) and the market rent gradient would have to decrease rather 4han increase for
residential locations closer-in than V'. (This is shown as the dotted line in Figure 3.) Thus
case 3 cannot be an equilibrium if only in-commuting is assumed to occur in the model."
To summarize the results of this section, we have shown that in an urban model with
decentralized job locations, households having identical tastes whose workers have identical
skill levels may nonetheless have different rent offer curves for land at the same residential
locations. This implies that households whose workers have different job locations may
segregate into different residential rings. The most likely pattern (but not the only one
possible) appears to be that households locate in concentric residential rings in order of
the centrality of their workers' job locations. This means that in equilibrium, households'
residential and job locations will be non-negatively related to each other.
4.2 Wage Gradients in Decentralized Cities
Turn now to the wage gradient. We wish to explore the properties of wage gradi-
ents and also to consider whether otherwise identical workers having different residential
locations are willing to work for different wage rates at the same workplace location.
We derived an expression for workers' wage offer curves in eq. (11) above. Examining
(11), the numerator is the cost of commuting per mile round trip and the denominator
is number of hours of work. With decentralized employment, the wage rate falls with
increases in employment suburbanization by the reduction in per mile commuting cost per
hour of work. The wage gradient must always be negative.
1
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Using the wage and rent offer curves, eqs. (8) and (9), we can determine in a relative
sense how quickly they each decline with distance from the CBD. Substituting eq. (8) into
eq. (9), we get:
W, (u, v) ph pu (u, v)
= (--) (14)w(u, v) wn p(u, v)
where n(u, v) = 24 - 2s(u - v) - (u, v) is hours of work. The percent rate of decrease of
the wage offer curve per extra mile of workplace distance from the CBD equals the percent
rate of decrease of the rent offer curve per extra mile of residential distance from the CBD
times the ratio of expenditure on residential land to earnings from labor. The ratio of
land expenditure to earnings depends on the location variables; however it must be less
than the ratio of housing expenditure to earnings. The latter has been well studied and
is usually thought to be around 25%.12 Thus the wage offer curve should be expected to
decline at a much lower proportionate rate with distance from the center than the rent
offer curve.
How does the rate of decline of workers' wage offer curves vary as job suburbanization
increases, holding residential location constant? To answer this, we differentiate the wage





The expression in parentheses in the numerator of (15) is the reduction in commuting
time per extra mile of job suburbanization when residential location is fixed, minus the
change in work time per extra mile of job suburbanization. In general we expect that
as employment becomes more suburbanized, workers will split the savings in commuting
time in some proportion between extra leisure and extra work. If so then n, is positive,
(-2s - ne,) is negative, and the sign of Ow,,/Bv must be positive.
Thus workers' wage offer curves must fall at a decreasing rate with greater workplace
suburbanization. As long as there is diminishing marginal utility of both leisure and goods,
the marginal value of leisure time and work time must increase as the commuting journey
gets longer and less time is available for both work and leisure. Leisure time is valued
directly and work time is valued because it leads to more income and therefore more
non-leisure goods. In order to induce workers to commute further toward the CBD from
fixed residential locations and therefore to give up more leisure and/or work time, the
wage gradient must allow for the fact that the value of time at the margin is increasing.
The wage gradient thus must increase at an increasing rate as v falls, i.e., as the CBD is
approached.
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It is interesting to note that a negative linear wage gradient is highly unlikely to
occur in the context of the model. Suppose we make the strong simplifying assumption
that work hours are fixed at n*. In this case, the slope of the wage gradient becomes
w,(v) = -- 2(sw(v) + m)/n*, and aw,/av = -2sw./n* > 0. Thus the wage gradient must
still decline at a decreasing rate with greater workplace distance from the CBD. As long
as leisure time enters the utility function, the resulting wage gradient cannot decrease at
a constant rate with workplace distance.13
Now consider whether otherwise identical workers whose residential locations differ
have different wage offer curves. Examining eq. (11), the wage offer curve clearly depends
on residential location, u, as well as on workplace location, v. To determine how workers'
wage offers at different job locations vary as residential location changes, we differentiate
eq. (11) partially with respect to u, holding v constant. This results in
Bw, nU- -w,(16)
au n
Since w,, is negative, the sign of eq. (16) depends on that of nu, the change in work
hours when residential location becomes more suburbanized, holding job location constant.
When residential distance from the center increases, commuting journey length increases,
leaving less time available for work and leisure together. It seems likely that workers
in this situation would share the time loss between reduced hours of work and reduced
leisure in some proportion. If so, then n. must be negative, which implies that aw,/Bu
must be negative. In that case, workers living at more distant residential locations must
have steeper wage offer curves. However since this argument is informal, we consider all
three possible signs of 8 s,/au briefly below.
Case 1. Continuing with the assumption that 8w,, /au is negative, suppose there are
only two residential locations, at u* and u**, where u** > u*, but workplace locations
locations vary continuously. Workers living at u** must have steeper wage offer curves
than workers living at u*. The two groups' wage offer curves are shown in Figure 4, where
the steeper curve labelled wI(v) is the wage offer curve of workers living at u* and the
flatter curve labelled w2(v) is the wage offer curve of workers living at u*. Since the market
wage gradient is the lower envelope of the wage offer curves, it is shown as the dashed line
in Figure 4. (Note that if only in-commuting occurs, the wage offer curve of workers living
at u* must end at v = u*.) The result in this case is that workers living at the closer
residential location get jobs at the closer-in range of workplace locations, from to = 0 to v',
while workers living at the more distant residential location get jobs at the more distant
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range of workplace locations, from v = v' to v = u**. In this case, all workers in-commute
to their jobs.
Note that under these assumptions, the market wage gradient, wm(v), can have any
shape as long as its slope is negative. As drawn in Figure 4, it is approximately negative
linear. But depending on the number of wage offer curves and how strongly they vary
with residential location, the market wage gradient could be observed to decline at an
increasing or a decreasing rate with increases in v. This differs from the result for the rent
functions, where the market rent gradient declined at a decreasing rate with distance, the
same shape as individual households' rent offer curves.
In this case, workers again are indifferent over a range of commuting journey lengths.
Workers living at u* are indifferent over job locations between v = 0 and v', and over
commuting journey lengths ranging from a minimum of u* - v' miles to a maximum of u*
miles. Workers living at u** are indifferent over job locations between v = v' and v = u**,
and over commuting journey lengths ranging from zero miles to u** - v' miles.
Case 2. Now suppose Ow,./au = 0. In this case the two wage offer curves in Figure 4
would be identical and the market wage gradient, wm(v), would be identical to the wage
offer curves. Workers living at both residential locations would be willing to work at any
job location for the same wage, as long as they in-commute to their jobs.
In this case, workers are indifferent over a wider range of commuting journey lengths.
For example, if there were again only two residential locations at u* and u**, then workers
living at u* would be indifferent over job locations between v = 0 and v = u* and over
commuting journey lengths ranging from zero miles to u* miles. Workers living at u**
would be indifferent over job locations between v = 0 and v = u** and over commuting
journey lengths ranging from zero miles to u** miles.
Case 3. Finally suppose that Ow./Ou < 0. Then the two wage offer curves shown in
Figure 4 would be reversed. The steeper curve, wi1 (v), would be the wage offer curve of
workers living at u* and the flatter curve would be the wage offer curve of workers living
at u**. In this case workers living at the more distant residential location would underbid
others for the closer-in jobs and workers living closer-in would underbid others for the more
distant jobs. In particular, workers living at u* would both in-commute and out-commute
to jobs located between v = v' and v = u**.
To show that this outcome cannot occur, examine the situation of two workers whose
households both live at u*. One worker works at v = u*- 1 and thus in-commutes and
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the other worker works at v = u* + 1 and thus out-commutes. The wage offer curve of
workers living at u* is wUi(v). Note that wi(v) equals the market wage gradient, wm(v),
from v = v' to the outer edge of the city. The worker who works at v = u* - 1 has a wage
rate of wi(u* -1) = wm(u* -1) and the worker who works at v = u* + 1 has a wage rate of
wi(u*+1) = wm(u*+1), where wm(u*-1) > wm(u*+1). But the two workers' households
cannot achieve equal utility. To see this, note that the indirect utility function for both
is V = V(p m (u), w m (v), F(u, v)), where full income, F(u, v), equals 24wm (v) minus total
per mile commuting cost times commuting distance. For the two workers living at u*,
rent is the same, and commuting distance is the same. This means that the only factors
entering the indirect utility function which differ are the wage rate and full income. The
worker who in-commutes has both a higher wage rate and a higher full income level than
the worker who out-commutes. Therefore the worker who in-commutes must be better off
than the worker who out-commutes and the situation represented in case 3 cannot be an
equilibrium. In order for out-commuting to occur, the market wage gradient must begin
to rise rather than fall for job locations further out than v = u*.
We have shown that in a city with decentralized employment in which all workers in-
commute to their jobs, workers living at different residential locations will tend to prefer
different job locations. It is interesting to note that the wage offer curves and market wage
gradient discussed here in cases 1 and 2 constitute the maximum possible wage reduction
that firms can achieve by moving to suburban locations. With this wage gradient, firms
have appropriated all of the gain to workers from shorter commuting journeys when job
locations become suburbanized.
4.3 Wage and rent gradients when there are multiple skill levels
Suppose now that we reintroduce the possibility that workers have different skill levels
and different wage rates. We wish to investigate how rent and wage offer curves and the
location pattern vary with workers' wage/skill level in cities with decentralized employ-
ment.
Assume that there are two skill groups, skilled workers and unskilled workers. As-
sume also that there are two employment locations, at v = 0 and v'. Then using the results
developed in sections 2 and 4.1 above, one outcome is that there will be four separate res-
idential rings, one for each skill class and workplace location. Such a situation is shown in
Figure 5. There, unskilled workers with CBD jobs have the steepest rent offer curve. They
occupy the innermost residential ring. They are surrounded by a ring of skilled CBD work-










suburban workers. The suburban employers must be located in a ring somewhere between
the CBD and the residential boundary between the second and third rings. The outermost
ring is occupied by skilled workers whose jobs are at the same suburban employment ring.
The market land price gradient is shown as the dashed line. The important result here is
that income/skill levels do not increase monotonically with residential distance from the
CBD, as is usual in urban models with centralized employment.
Now turn to workers' wage offer curves. We can investigate how they vary with skill
level by differentiating eq. (12) with respect to w(v), holding everything else constant. We
get
Ow,,(v) _1w(V)= -[-2s - nww, Wl(16)
ow(v) n
The first term in (16) is the effect on the wage offer curve of the increase in the value of
time spent commuting, which is negative. As higher wages make time more valuable, the
wage offer curve gets steeper. The second term is the effect on the wage offer curve of the
change in time spent working. It is positive if n. is positive, i.e., if time spent working
increases when the wage rate rises. (This requires that the positive substitution effect on
work time outweigh the negative income effect when the wage rate rises.) If so then the
effect of the second term in (16) is also to make the wage offer curve steeper as the wage
rate rises.14 Returning to eq. (16), while the sign of w,/w is ambiguous, we assume here
that it is negative because the commuting cost effect is more important than the labor
supply effect. If so, then workers' wage offer curves become steeper as their skill levels rise.
In this case, the model predicts that firms have stronger incentives to suburbanize as the
average skill level and wage rate of their workers rises. This is because the wage offer curves
of highly skilled workers fall more steeply with greater workplace distance from the CBD.
In contrast, employers of low skill workers have much less incentive to suburbanize because
low skilled workers' flatter wage offer curves cause the cost reduction from suburbanization
to be smaller. Further, since low skill workers tend to choose residential locations close to
the CBD and there is no out-commuting in the model, employers cannot move very far
from the CBD without severely restricting their potential labor supply. This also will tend
to keep them close to the CBD.
These results seem realistic in a general way, since we often observe that firms whose
workforce contains a high proportion of very skilled workers choose to locate in the subur bs.
Research and development branches of large corporations are an example. In contrast,
firms that employ a mixture of highly skilled and less skilled workers seem more likely to
locate in the CBD. Banks and brokerage firms are examples of the latter.
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We can illustrate the variation in the wage offer curves with skill level. Assume that
there are two skill groups in the city and that all skilled workers live in more distant
residential rings than unskilled workers. The residential boundary between the two groups
is at u'. Firms are assumed to be at scattered locations. Also each firm is assumed to hire
only one type of worker, not both. Figure 6 shows separate wage offer curves for skilled
and unskilled workers. Unskilled workers' wage offer curve is flatter and ends at i', since
no firm employing unskilled workers will locate further out than these workers live. Firms
employing skilled workers can locate anywhere in the city. Thus firms employing either
type of worker may mix together in in the thick ring from v = 0 to u', while only firms
employing skilled workers will locate in the surrounding thick ring from v = u' to the outer
edge of the city. Note that firms are not bidding against each other for sites here, nor are
workers of each skill type bidding against each other for jobs. We cannot predict from
the wage offer curves that either type of firm outbids the other for sites at any particular
location. To answer this question, we would need to determine how much firms of each
type could pay for land at any v assuming that the relevant profit conditions were met.
The rent offer curve for firms has no necessary relation to their wage gradient.
5. Commuting Behavior and the Indifference Property
In a city with multiple skill levels but only CBD employment (shown in Figure 2),
workers of any income level are indifferent over a range of commuting journey lengths.
The range of commuting journey lengths covered by the indifference property extends
from journeys between the CBD and the innermost location in the thick residential ring
occupied by that income group to journeys between the CBD and the outermost location
in the same residential ring. Workers are indifferent over this range of commuting journey
lengths because a longer commute is compensated by lower housing prices at more distant
residential locations.
This research was started with the intent of exploring whether an analogous indiffer-
ence property exists over commuting journeys of varying lengths in a decentralized city.16
In fact it seemed that the indifference property applying in decentralized cities would be
far more general. With suburban as well as CBD job locations as possibilities, workers liv-
ing in any residential ring could potentially be indifferent over commuting journey lengths
ranging from working at home (a zero length commute) to working at the CBD to working
anywhere in between. Extensions of the commuting journey caused by changes in work-
place location would be compensated by changes in the wage rate, while extensions of the
commuting journey caused by changes in residential location would be compensated by
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lower housing prices. Preferences for particular commuting journey lengths would exist
only for households with atypical tastes, such as those having two workers in a city where
households generally have only one worker.
In fact, this paper has shown that the commuting indifference property in decentral-
ized cities holds only in a special case described in Section 4. In general, we have shown
that households' rent offer curves for land for housing depend on their workers' job loca-
tions. In addition, we showed that workers' wage offer curves for different job locations
vary depending on their households' residential locations. These properties tend to lead
to a residential pattern in which households segregate themselves into rings depending on
their workers' job locations, even if they have the same income and tastes. Hence the indif-
ference property in a decentralized city model is narrower rather than wider than in that
applying in the centralized employment model: workers stratify into different residential
rings depending on both their income levels and their job locations. Even with only a few
income classes and a few job locations, these residential rings will tend to become fairly
narrow. The only indifference property applying over commuting journeys is that workers
will be indifferent over all journey lengths between their preferred residential rings and
the ring of workplace locations associated with that residential ring. If the relevant rings
are thin, then the indifference property will apply only over a narrow range of commuting
journey lengths. Thus there is no generalized indifference applying to commuting journey
lengths in the decentralized city.
It is difficult to determine from a theoretical model how important the segmentation
effect is. In practice, households may be almost indifferent over residential rings regardless
of their workplace location, or the incentive to choose different residential rings depending
on job location may be strong. A clear next step in this type of research would be a
simulation model which could investigate this question. But although the model did not
do very well in terms of providing a strong indifference property, it does provide a rich set
of possible outcomes concerning patterns of residential location by households of different
income levels, enabling researchers to explore more complex urban location patterns. It
also suggests that if good research on commuting patterns is to proceed, we need better
data concerning both residential and job location within metropolitan areas, in addition
to the obvious need for data on actual commuting journey length.
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FOOTNOTES
*1 am grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and to the Urban Research Center,
New York University, for research upport. Roger Gordon, David Pines and an anonymous
referee provided very helpful comments.
'Models of cities with decentralized employment include Moses [8], Muth [9]), Mills
[7], White [15J, Beckmann [1], Capozza [3], Brueckner [2], Ogawa and Fujita [101 and [11],
and Straszheim [14].
2See Mills [7], Rees and Shultz [12], and Madden and White [6].
3The capital used in housing, i.e., the structure itself, is assumed to be part of the
composite good.
4See Mills [7] for a description of the extra equations needed to close a model similar
to this one.
'The characteristics of households' rent offer curves for land for housing and the
market rent gradient were discussed in section 2 for the centralized employment case and
are discussed in section 4 below for the decentralized employment case.
6Are these assumptions realistic? In a recent study, Simpson (1980) finds that 70
percent of a sample of households living in London who were not recent movers had jobs
closer to the center than their homes and had job locations that were in the same direction
away from the center as their residential locations. The criterion used to determine whether
households' job and residential locations were in the same direction away from the center
was that they both be in a pie shaped wedge having its center at the city center and an
angle of .25ir radians or one-eighth of a circle. However, Hamilton [4] presents data which
suggest that much more commuting actually occurs in U.S. cities than these assumptions
imply.
7Other patterns of employment decentralization are also possible, but they may give
rise to different spatial wage and price gradients than those considered here. For example,
White [15] analyzed a model of a city in which employment was located both at the CBD
and at a suburban subcenter at an arbitrarily chosen distance ring. In that model, the con-
centration of jobs at the subcenter results in a labor shortage, causing wages there to rise
in order to attract additional workers who live closer to the CBD than the subcenter and
therefore must out-commute. The resulting land price gradient is double-peaked, having a
second local maximum at the suburban subcenter. This type of model, in which employ-
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ment decentralization is profitable even when labor shortages in the suburbs require that
wages be raised to attract out-commuters, is only reasonable if agglomeration economies
or some important cost savings results from locating at the subcenter. In the ring subcen-
ter model, the cost savings results from the existence of a circumferential highway at the
subcenter location.
8The rent and wage offer curves can also be derived straighforwardly from households'
indirect utility function, making use of Roy's Identity.
*Actually, suburban worker' households are willing to bid for land closer-in than v'.
But from these locations they would have to out-commute to work, causing their rent offer
curves to decline as they located further from v' in the direction approaching the CBD.
'0See White [17] for discussion and estimation of a model of commuting behavior in
this case. If there are multiple income/skill levels, then the indifference property discussed
above holds within the residential ring chosen by households of that income/skill level.
"Note that if out-commuting occurred, there could be a second region just outside
the CBD occupied by households whose workers have CBD jobs.
1'This relationship was pointed out by Muth [9J.
'3 Many researchers have assumed or derived linear wage gradients in models of de-
centralized cities, usually in models in which leisure time does not enter households' utility
functions. See White [15] and Ogawa and Fujita [10].
141t is interesting to note that the two terms in (16) have a similar interpretation to
the two terms which result when the rent offer curve changes in response to a change in
the wage rate, as discussed in section 2 above. The two terms there consist of a value of
commuting time effect, which is negative, and a change in housing demand effect, which
is positive. The latter is usually assumed to outweigh the former, causing higher wage
households to have flatter rent offer curves than lower wage households.
15 See Simpson [13], White [16] and Madden [5] for other approaches to explaining
commuting behavior in decentralized cities.
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